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Introduction  
 
South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) has long been seen as an 
unqualified success story, with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
rising at an average annual rate of nearly 7 per cent since the mid-1960s. Yet, 
the formerly successful strategy was tested to its limits, rather unexpectedly, 
with the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The resulting 
economic meltdown triggered a dramatic change in economic policies and, 
more generally, in the way Korea relates to the global economy.  
A number of policies pinpointed earlier as the key to the Korean 
‘miracle’ came under heavy attack in the wake of the crisis. In particular, 
Government interventionism was deemed to have been excessive and to be 
one of the major causes of the crisis because of the so-called moral hazard 
phenomena. As a result, Government interventions are likely to be trimmed 
down, and more leeway is expected to be given to market mechanisms. As 
an integral part of the country’s industrial policy, measures regarding direct 
investment have been deeply reformed and the economy is now completely 
open to foreign investors. At the same time, Korean investors are likely to 
reduce their involvement abroad.    
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, it examines how 
Korea took advantage of globalization in the past to sustain its growth 
dynamics. Secondly, it assesses the change in the way the country 
participates in, and responds to, globalization in the wake of the crisis. To 
that purpose, the main emphasis is placed on the role of both inward and 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI). In other words, the chapter aims 
to explore how FDI has influenced the restructuring of the Korean 
economy in the past and how it can be expected to continue to do so in the 
future.  
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In a first section, the chapter briefly sketches the major features of the 
Korean economic miracle, stressing the contribution of Government 
interventions, and highlighting both the strengths and weaknesses of past 
public policies. It also highlights the 1997 Asian financial crisis and its 
implications for the Korean economy. The second and third sections 
examine the role played respectively by inward and outward FDI in the 
development of Korea, as well as the changes triggered by the recent 
financial crisis and, more generally, by the changing environment. The 
analysis is based on a thorough examination of policy provisions as well as 
of FDI trends.  
 
 
The Rise and Fall of the Korean Economy  
 
Economic Performance and the Developmental State 
 
Changes in Korea’s industrial structure  Korea was one of the poorest 
countries in the world in the late-1950s and was considered at the time as a 
real ‘basket case’ without any positive growth prospects. Yet over the 
period 1960-96, its real GDP grew by 8.4 per cent on average per annum, 
as it transformed from a poor agricultural economy into a newly 
industrializing economy (NIE). In the mid-1990s, Korea’s real per capita 
income was nearly 9 times what it had been in the early-1960s, equal to 
some Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, enabling it to access the industrialized countries’ club in 1996.   
This remarkable and steady growth was accompanied by drastic 
structural changes. The rapid contraction of the primary sector was 
matched in particular by a dramatic expansion of the manufacturing 
industry, which grew by more than 15 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
share of agriculture dropped from 40 per cent in 1960 to 6.3 per cent in 
1996, while the share of manufacturing rose from 12 to 31 per cent. Among 
the manufacturing sectors, the durable goods industries showed the highest 
growth rate during the 1973-80 period. Eventually, labor-intensive 
industries, such as textiles, were gradually replaced by capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive industries such as electronics and automobile.  
Similarly, changes in commodity trade patterns were significant. First, 
manufactured exports rose from less than $0.1 billion in 1961 to $100 
billion in 1995, and to $172 billion in 2000. In 1961, all but one (plywood) of 
the largest ten exports was a primary commodity. By 1975, apparel and clothing 
were the largest single commodity group of exports, but it was soon 
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surpassed by electrical and electronics goods by the mid-1980s (see Figure 1).  
The development of the Korean economy can be said to be unusual for 
two reasons. First, because of its stellar export performances, which makes 
it an exceptionally open economy (at least from the trade perspective). A 
second feature is the relative importance of heavy and chemical industries 
in the country’s evolution.  
 
Figure 1 Korea’s Structure of Exports, 1967-1999. 
 
Changes in Korea’s economic policies  The impressive economic 
performances highlighted above can be accounted for to a large extent by 
the tight control of the Government over the industrialization path of the 
country. The successive changes in Korea’s industrial policies can be 
briefly summarized as follows:  
• The first period (1961-1971) can be characterized as a period of ‘easy 
import-substitution’ of non-durable consumer goods and intermediate 
materials, progressively combined with a resolute outward looking strategy. 
The major means of implementing the government’s objectives at that time 
were the so-called policy loans. Export-oriented industrialization was 
chosen as a strategy to consolidate political power through economic 
development, and maximization of exports was clearly the top priority over 
all other policy objectives. In order to encourage exports, the Government 
relied heavily on financial policy tools rather than on fiscal policy or the 
use of public enterprises. The most important of these measures were 
preferential credits for exporters, tax subsidies, the establishment of free 
South Korea: Structure of exports, 1967-99
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
Textile and clothing
Electrical and electronics products
Agricultural products
Source: CHELEM, CEPII
Automobile and parts
4  International trade, capital flows and economic development in East Asia 
 
trade zones and tariff exemptions for raw material imports earmarked for 
exports. By contrast to what was observed in other countries, the mix of 
import-substitution and export-promotion proved to be successful in Korea, 
certainly thanks to the highly centralized structure of the Government 
(Park, 1988). 
• During the second period (1972-1981), export growth together with 
industrial deepening were maintained as priorities. Korean authorities 
wanted at the time to construct a self-supportive industrial structure based 
on heavy and chemical industries. They thus decided to launch the Heavy 
and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive, while reducing to some extent the 
wide-ranging incentives hitherto accorded to exports. This strategy 
imposed substantial costs on the economy. In particular, because the 
Korean system of industrial targeting leaned more toward foreign 
borrowing than FDI, the strategy led to a rapid increase in external debt 
(Cho, 1994). The difficulties encountered with the implementation of the 
HCI led to a new shift in the country’s industrial policy and the 
Government started to opt for an indirect rather than a direct form of 
control of the economy.  
• The third period (1982-97) can be said to be a period of economic 
liberalization and globalization (Chung and Wang, 2000). During this 
period, the Government started to reduce its role in industrial planning and 
targeting in order to promote competition in domestic markets. A first 
round of privatization went hand in hand with various market opening 
measures (with respect to imports as well as FDI). Overall, there was 
certainly more progress in external liberalization than in internal 
liberalization and the Government remained heavy-handed. In particular, 
despite the official abandonment of targeted industrial policies, the 
Government continued to act directly in the financial markets through the 
Korea Development Bank, which provided long-term investment funds to 
companies (Haggard and Mo, 2000).  
 
The state and the chaebols  A well-known characteristic of Korea’s 
development strategy is the Government’s tight control over all aspects of 
economic activity, and its decisive role in the fast industrialization process 
that started in the 1960s. During the initial period of Korea’s economic 
development, the Government assumed an active and direct role in 
particular through the establishment of the Economic Planning Board (in 
1961), which played a key role in economic policy-making. Heavy state 
interventionism was particularly manifest in the financial sector. As a result 
of the financial reform (law for dealing with illicit wealth accumulation) in 
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1961, all commercial banks became in essence the property of the state and 
were placed under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance. This law 
enabled the Government to exert control over the allocation of credit, and 
to tightly monitor its sectoral development - rewarding companies, which 
fell in with its development strategy and punishing those, which did not. 
Through this original form of planning and of credit allocation, the 
Government set the objectives, which were realized by private firms 
(Lanzarotti, 1992). As explained above, the Government provided 
subsidies, financial assistance, and tax breaks to key industries to promote 
exports and industrial upgrading. 
A major consequence of the interventionist stance of the Korean 
Government is the emergence of large industrial conglomerates, the 
chaebols. This is a major difference with the other NIEs, in particular 
Taiwan, and a major similarity with Japanese keiretsu (see Chapter 2). In 
Korea, economic policy has had a clear tendency to emphasize scale 
economies. For that matter, financial support was given to industries with a 
certain minimum scale of efficient production, especially during the HCI 
drive, thus fostering the expansion of large diversified conglomerates. By 
the same token, as a means of promoting exports, the Government 
established so-called General Trading Companies (GTCs), which were 
modeled after a Japanese institution. The GTCs, which were usually 
selected among the chaebols, were given special benefits and were in 
charge of handling export business for other exporters as well as for 
themselves. The creation of the chaebols system thus depended crucially on 
Government’s intervention in the financial system.  
One major consequence of the developmental state is the existence of a 
close business-government relationship so characteristic of Korean chaebol 
capitalism.  
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its Implications for the Korean Economy 
 
Until 1997, Korea seemed an unqualified success story with very short 
periods of economic slowdown. Yet some of the seeds of the current crisis 
had been sown long before, in the form of institutional deficiencies and 
policy mistakes. Such is the case for the practices in the banking sector as 
well as the collusive relationships between the Government, and the 
banking and the business communities. These cozy relationships together 
with the tradition of high indebtedness in Korean conglomerates fuelled the 
accumulation of imbalances and encouraged investment in excess 
capacities and in non-profitable activities. This nature of the business-
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Government relations contributed to problems of moral hazard during the 
investment boom in the mid-1990s (Haggard and Mo, 2000). 
The main trigger of the difficulties came from the sharp slowdown in 
export growth in 1996. Merchandise export growth dropped from more 
than 30 per cent in 1995 to a mere 4 per cent in 1996 (ADB, 1997), and the 
current account deficit widened from 2 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent. This 
development was the result of a number of factors, both internal and 
external. The won appreciation was one, the slump in world demand for 
electronic products accompanied by falling world prices was another. Yet, 
prices of electronic products were not the only prices to drop significantly. 
Such was also the case for ships, automobiles and garments, thus affecting 
50 per cent of Korea’s total exports. Corporate failures (Hanbo Steel and 
Kia Group in particular) soon followed, raising doubts about the health of 
the Korean economy and the chaebols’ ability to repay their debts. The 
excessively high leverage of the corporate sector can be pinned down as a 
major weakness because rapid growth was essential to the solvency of this 
sector, equivalent to a corporate Ponzi game (Adelman and Nak, 1998). A 
combination of the setback in economic growth and the financial crisis in 
the rest of Asia gave a final blow to the Korean economy, unveiling the 
numerous weaknesses and imbalances that had accumulated over time. A 
major financial and currency crisis broke out in November 1997, with the 
won tumbling 50 per cent during a two-week span. The crisis came to a 
head in early-1998 when Korea was on the brink of default. 
By contrast to a number of previous crises, the Asian financial crisis, 
with the Korean crisis as a case in point, was the result of over-investment, 
rather than excessive consumption. Investments in over-capacities were 
mainly due to the chaebols and were clearly the results of complacency on 
the part of public authorities. The crisis highlighted the need for a complete 
overhaul of Korea’s development strategy, and for a redefinition of the role 
of the chaebols. Other factors also call for a resolute shift in economic 
policy. Korea has committed to push liberalization and market opening 
further under the pressure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
OECD. As is the case for Japan, global economic conditions are likely to 
continue to restructure and push for a ‘normalization’ of the Korean 
economy, and of its regulatory environment towards more convergence 
with the industrial policies of other advanced industrial nations (Blomström 
et al, 2000).  
Finally it can also be anticipated that Korea will have to face rising 
competition from other economies in the region, in particular China, and to 
adapt to another challenge, namely the rise of the knowledge-based 
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economy (see Chapter 2).   
 
 
Inward FDI  
 
Inward FDI is one of the domains in which the Korean Government exerted 
a large influence. By contrast to other high performing Asian economies, 
Korea did not opt for a systematic promotion of inward FDI but chose a 
more selective strategy. Yet FDI was clearly used as an instrument of 
industrial policy. For instance, by targeting specific industries, the 
Government definitely helped shape the Korean industrial structure.  
 
Pre-crisis FDI 
 
Policies  The constant Government’s desire to monitor closely any changes 
in the economy is also reflected in policy measures regarding FDI. A 
passive liberal policy with respect to FDI may only attract multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) into areas of static comparative advantages, while 
selective and functional interventions may help guide FDI into dynamic 
and more complex activities with higher potential for technological 
spillovers (Lall, 1996). Moreover, as suggested by a number of empirical 
studies, a minimum threshold of technological capabilities is necessary for 
FDI to generate benefits to the host country (Borensztein et al, 1998). All 
this points to the need for public intervention. The Korean approach to FDI 
was apparently based on such premises.  
In contrast to other emerging economies, Korea has followed an 
extremely selective policy towards foreign investors, with restrictions being 
imposed in accordance with development priorities defined by domestic 
economic authorities. Broadly speaking, FDI was kept out unless deemed 
necessary for technology access or exports, while joint ventures and 
licensing were encouraged. Technology transfer requirements to domestic 
firms were also used by Korea in the 1960s so as to encourage technology 
transfer.  
The Government took a rather favorable stance toward export-oriented 
foreign companies with the creation of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) based on 
the Free Export Zone Establishment Act of January 1970. The first zone 
was established in Masan in 1971, soon followed by the Iksan FTZ in 1975. 
These zones are specifically designated industrial areas in which foreign 
invested firms can manufacture, assemble or process export products using 
tax-free imported raw materials or semi-finished goods.  
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In addition to the theoretical factors presented earlier, the rationale for 
the rather restrictive stance towards FDI can be explained as follows. First, 
the Government did not encourage FDI for fear that the economy would be 
dominated by foreign interests preventing the development of domestic 
firms’ competitiveness. This is in relation to Korea’s historical background 
in particular, to Japanese occupation and domination of Korea (Sakong, 
1993). The choice has always been to favor externalized growth (i.e. 
through sub-contracting) rather than internalized expansion through foreign 
ownership (Lall, 1997). Secondly, foreign borrowing was favored over FDI 
because it made government’s control more effective. Finally, as priority 
was given at first to low-tech labor-intensive export production, FDI was 
not perceived as necessary.  
As a result, in particular, of the difficulties raised by the HCI scheme 
and the rise in the nation’s debt service capability, the Government realized 
that FDI could play more of a role in the development strategy of the 
country. A first move took place in 1981 with the opening up of a large 
number of business categories to foreign investment. These comprised 427 
business categories constituting about 50 per cent of all products in Korea’s 
standard industrial classification system. Yet the basic direction of FDI 
policy was not really changed until 1984 with the revision of the Foreign 
Capital Inducement Act, which reflected a less stringent Government 
control on FDI. In particular, there was a switch to a negative list system, 
and to an automatic approval system, while restrictions on the repatriation 
of capital and the foreign ownership ratio were abolished (Seong, 1997). 
The liberalization of FDI rules was seen as a possible way of helping the 
economy in its attempt to upgrade technologically, and to restructure the 
industry toward higher value-added and more sophisticated production. 
While licensing had proved to be an efficient channel for transferring 
mature technologies, new technologies were found to be better transferred 
through joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries (Chaponnière, 1997).  
In 1989, the United States of America (US) government threatened to 
designate Korea as a Priority Foreign Country because of its discriminatory 
practices. As a result, market liberalization and opening became an 
important objective for the Korean Government in the early-1990s. 
Moreover, the perspective of Korea’s accession to the OECD gave a new 
momentum to various market opening measures particularly, to the further 
liberalization of FDI policy. Local content and export level requirements 
were abolished, together with mandatory technology transfers. Yet the 
government remained cautious and opted for a gradual liberalization. 
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Trends  During the first period which extended from the early-1960s to the 
mid-1980s, FDI inflows were minimal. The real take-off occurred in the 
second half of the 1980s (see Table 1 and Figure 2). FDI inflows rose from 
$682 million over the period 1971-80 to $5080 million over the period 
1981-90, a change comparable to what was observed in Colombia (OECD, 
1995). After peaking in 1988, there was a brief setback in the early 1990s, 
followed by a new surge in 1995.  
 
 
Table 1 Inward FDI Trends ($ million) 
 
Year Notification basis Arrival basis Balance of Payments basis 
1962-81* 93.305 73.893 67.83 
1982-86* 353.546 231.560 188.2 
1987-88* 1173.542 759.826 815.2 
1989 1090.279 812.315 1117.8 
1990 802.635 895.397 788.5 
1991 1395.996 1177.245 1179.8 
1992 894.476 803.311 728.3 
1993 1044.274 728.148 588.1 
1994 1316.505 991.565 809.0 
1995 1947.229 1361.925 1775.8 
1996 3202.580 2309.978 2325.4 
1997 6970.915 3088.356 2844.2 
1998 8852.527 5221.249 5412.3 
1999 15541.547 10597.857 9333.4 
2000 15689.857 10185.169 9283.1 
2001 11870.000 Not available 3198.3 
Note:  * - Annual averages. 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy and Bank of Korea.  
 
The general pattern in FDI inflows can be clearly related to changes in 
policy stance vis-à-vis FDI (see Nicolas, 2001 for a more detailed account 
of FDI inflows to Korea). As a result of the restrictive stance described 
above, FDI stock as a percentage of GDP (see Table 2) was lower by about 
half in Korea than in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the late-1970s 
(approximately 3 per cent). Similarly, the penetration ratio by foreign firms 
was in the 1960s and the 1970s much smaller than in Latin American or 
other Asian countries (Lanzarotti, 1992). Reflecting the limited openness of 
the domestic market, foreign presence was particularly limited in Korea in 
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industries (beverages and tobacco and chemicals such as soap and 
detergents) where international brand name consumer products are 
important (Hill and Johns, 1985). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Korean FDI and OFDI, 1976-2000. 
 
The slowdown in the late-1980s to early-1990s can be accounted for by 
the deterioration in Korea’s locational advantages particularly, increased 
labor disputes and a sharp rise in real estate prices. These developments 
made Korea less attractive than some Southeast Asian economies. The 
renewed surge since the mid-1990s was certainly largely due to the 
government’s policy of foreign investment promotion. For instance, FDI in 
high-tech industries such as electronics and machinery was subsidized 
through tax exemptions and low rental rates in industrial parks (Kim and 
Wang, 1996). 
Government intervention had also a clear impact on the sectoral 
orientation of FDI as well as on the form of participation. The prevalence 
of the manufacturing sector was the result of Korea’s locational advantages 
in the form of an abundant labor force and the lack of natural resources, as 
well as government’s policy favoring FDI flows into these activities 
(Sakong, 1993). At first, FDI flows were welcomed into light 
manufacturing export industries whereas they were discouraged from 
import-substituting industries such as pharmaceuticals and heavy industry 
(Koo, 1981). During the period 1962-1980, FDI into textile and clothing 
industries seeking to exploit low-wage labor was quite significant, 
contributing about 12 per cent of total manufacturing FDI. Yet FDI was 
even more heavily concentrated in sectors in need of technological inputs, 
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such as the chemical industry (26 per cent of total manufacturing FDI) or 
the electrical and electronics industry (18 per cent). This pattern was 
clearly the result of government policies rather than of locational 
advantages in the form of cheap labor (Lanzarotti, 1992).   
 
 
Table 2 The Ratio of Inward FDI Stocks to GDP (%) 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
China 3.1 3.4 7.0 19.6 30.9 
Hong Kong, China 487.0 413.6 217.5 135.4 255.5 
Indonesia 14.2 28.6 34.0 25.0 46.2 
Republic of Korea 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.1 7.9 
Malaysia 21.1 23.7 24.1 32.9 65.3 
Philippines 3.9 8.5 7.4 8.2 14.9 
Singapore 52.9 73.6 76.3 70.0 97.5 
Taiwan 5.8 4.7 6.1 6.0 8.0 
Thailand 3.0 5.1 9.6 10.4 17.5 
Source: UNCTAD (2001). 
 
The impact of public policies could also be felt in the clear difference in 
the orientation and form of FDI to be found in FTZs, and in the rest of the 
country. In FTZs, MNEs tended to be concentrated in low-wage production 
and to be 100 per cent foreign-owned, but such was not the case in the rest 
of the economy where labor intensity and the level of foreign equity 
participation were much lower. This is in sharp contrast with the traditional 
view according to which all MNEs in Korea sought exclusively to take 
advantage of cheap local labor. 
While manufacturing was the largest recipient in the early period (64 
per cent during 1962-86), the service sector eventually gained importance, 
accounting for 60 per cent of total FDI in 1995 (see Table 3). FDI in the 
service sector started exceeding FDI in manufacturing from 1994 (Hong, 
1998). This change reflected the relaxation of restrictions to foreign 
investors in this sector as well as the rise in the relative importance of these 
activities in the Korean economy.  
Within the manufacturing sector, the chemical industry was still 
attracting a large share of inflows in the late-1980s, together with the 
electrical and electronics sector, and the transport equipment industry. The 
large role played by the chemical industry helped turn Korea into a net 
exporter of chemical products, primarily to the rest of  
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Table 3 Industrial Composition of Inward FDI (%) 
 
 1961-
1980 
1981-
1985 
1986-
1990 
1991-
1995 
1996-
2000 
Agriculture/Fishery/Forestry 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.8 
Mining 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Manufacturing 70.7 71.3 61.8 58.9 56.8 
Food 2.0 5.1 4.5 3.1 4.8 
Textile and Clothing 8.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 0.5 
Paper and Lumber 0.3 1.9 0.7 1.0 3.4 
Chemical Engineering 18.6 13.7 11.2 17.8 5.9 
Fertilizer 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Medicine 0.8 5.7 3.7 3.3 1.0 
Petroleum 6.1 0.7 1.3 9.2 2.4 
Ceramics 1.8 0.4 1.1 2.5 2.4 
Metal 5.2 2.9 1.1 1.0 2.5 
Machinery 5.4 2.7 7.2 6.7 9.0 
Electronics and Electrical Equipment 13.0 21.0 16.6 7.2 16.5 
Transport Equipment 4.3 15.1 11.8 4.4 6.7 
Other manufacturing 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.7 
Service 28.3 28.3 37.8 41.1 42.3 
Electricity and Gas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.9 
Construction 0.1 4.8 0.2 0.4 0.3 
Wholesales and Retails 0.0 1.8 0.1 2.0 6.6 
Trade Business 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.8 3.1 
Restaurant 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 
Lodging 15.1 9.2 23.9 7.2 0.9 
Transport and Warehousing 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.6 
Finance 7.7 9.5 8.5 14.0 13.2 
Insurance 0.2 0.1 2.1 3.1 3.2 
Real Estate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Other Service 3.4 2.0 1.2 4.6 11.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. 
 
Asia. By contrast, textiles and clothing industries gradually lost importance 
(reaching 3 per cent of total manufacturing FDI in the period 1994-97) and 
were replaced by the transport equipment and the food industries. Textiles 
and clothing fell prey to the loss of competitiveness of labor-intensive and 
low-tech products as a result of rising wages. The shift in sectoral 
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composition of inward FDI away from labor-intensive to more capital-
intensive sectors also possibly reflects the attainment by Korean firms of 
some ownership advantages. 
The trends observed in the period 1984-93 were reinforced further in the 
latest period. The rise of FDI in the food industry probably illustrates the 
rise in the role played by domestic demand. This form of market-seeking 
FDI occurred quite late because of previously restrictive policies. The 
composition of FDI in the service sector has also changed accordingly with 
investment into wholesale and retail trade as well as in financing and 
insurance gaining ground relative to hotel business (Kim and Hwang, 
1998).   
Traditionally, the US and Japan have been the main investors in Korea 
(see Table 4). European countries emerged only recently as active 
participants in the Korean market, overtaking Japan in the 1991-96 period. 
This recent move suggests that European producers may be seeking to 
exploit the Korean as well as the Asian market (ESCAP, 1998).  
 
 
Table 4 Shares of FDI from Selected Source Countries, 1962-2000 
 
 
1962-1981 1982-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 
Japan 55.1 36.4 12.1 9.0 
Malaysia 0.0 0.1 18.0 11.8 
USA 25.6 29.3 16.7 19.5 
Europe 8.7 28.3 44.9 42.7 
UK 2.0 3.2 2.8 2.3 
Netherlands 1.9 9.4 10.3 21.6 
France 1.1 3.2 9.2 13.4 
Germany 2.0 5.6 7.2 10.3 
Ireland 0.0 1.5 11.9 0.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy.  
 
 
Assessment   
 
A first point to stress is that foreigners’ interest in Korea as a destination 
for FDI was manifested in the 1970s, after a decade of strong development. 
Consequently, they certainly cannot be held responsible for Korea’s 
economic success (Lanzarotti, 1992).  
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In Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico, FDI contributed 
significantly to the development of their manufacturing sectors, serving 
large domestic markets and expanding consumer durable and intermediate 
goods industries (Kim and Wang, 1996). By contrast, FDI played a 
negligible role in the early stages of Korea’s economic development and its 
industrialization was realized on the basis of national enterprises (Amsden, 
1989). FDI inflows remained modest first because Korea is not a natural 
resource-rich country, and secondly because of restrictive public policies. 
 
Figure 3 Electronics and Electrical Equipment: Exports, FDI and 
OFDI, 1961-2000 
 
Yet, as emphasized by Lanzarotti (1992), the modest volume of FDI in 
Korea does not mean that FDI played no role in changing the country’s 
productive system. To the contrary, MNEs were an important input in 
Korea’s industrialization and substantially contributed to the success of its 
export-led strategy as well as to the upgrading of local technological 
capacities. First, FDI contributed in shaping the Korean industrial structure. 
The heavy machinery, petrochemical and petrol refining industries would 
never have gotten off the ground in Korea in the absence of FDI. Similarly, 
multinational pharmaceutical firms helped the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry develop new drugs by boosting local research capabilities (Kim 
and Hwang, 1998). Finally, a number of global giants in the electronics 
industry established themselves in Korea as early as the mid-1970s and 
helped shift the country’s pattern of production away from labor-intensive 
activities towards more technology-intensive activities. FDI was also 
instrumental in starting the production of many fast-growing export lines 
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such as radios (Hobday, 1995). As Figure 3 illustrates, the rise in the share 
of FDI in the electronics and electrical equipment industry went hand in 
hand with a rise in the share of exports of such products. Subsidiaries of 
foreign semi-conductor firms certainly contributed to the emergence of 
domestic firms as major players in the world market. In the late 1960s, a 
number of American and Japanese MNCs established assembly and test 
facilities in Korea, allowing Samsung and LG to enter the industry in the 
1970s through joint-ventures with foreign producers, and become world 
class semiconductor manufacturers (for a more detailed account, see Kim, 
1999). Figure 3 also suggests that domestic firms must have taken over, 
since exports of electronics and electrical goods continued to rise while 
FDI in this sector dropped in relative terms.   
In the electronics industry, fully foreign-owned FDI was restricted 
although joint ventures were perceived favorably (Amsden, 1989). 
Subsequently, MNEs were used by the Government mainly to further the 
acquisition of technology by local firms and help them develop new 
ownership advantages (Lall, 1996). In other words, FDI was not the major 
engine of technological development, but it was used in such a way as to 
strengthen the local technological capacities. During the first period, there 
was no real problem of ownership because FDI helped develop local skills 
and local firms.  
There are a number of different channels through which positive 
spillovers may affect a host economy. Linkages can be enhanced through 
information and matchmaking, technological upgrading, training, and 
financing. Various measures can encourage technology transfer from 
foreign affiliates to their local suppliers and facilitate technological 
upgrading. In Korea, technology transfer requirements to domestic firms 
were used in the 1960s but were eventually discontinued as the measure 
merely encouraged the transfer of obsolete technologies (UNCTAD, 2001). 
Further measures can help bring suppliers and foreign affiliates together 
and strengthen their linkages. They can be of a general nature or may be 
more proactive through specific linkage promotion programs usually 
focused on a limited number of industries and firms. In Korea, local 
content requirements contributed to the development of supplier industries. 
In addition, the 1984 Act on Fair Transactions and Subcontracting gave the 
Government supervisory authority to monitor buyer-supplier transactions 
(UNCTAD, 2001). In addition, foreign firms also contributed to 
establishing supporting industries either by founding suppliers themselves 
or by helping former employees to establish their start-up suppliers (Kim, 
1999).     
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The contribution of foreign firms may be in the sphere of technology as 
well as in the sphere of management techniques. Also, the presence of 
foreign firms in highly dynamic sectors, such as the electronics industry, 
contributed to the good trade performance of the economy. In 1972, foreign 
firms accounted for 55 per cent of Korea’s exports of electronics products. 
On the downside of foreign presence, Yun and Lee (2001) have 
examined how FDI has impacted on market structure and competition in 
Korean manufacturing industries during the 1990s (before the crisis), and 
found that FDI had an upward influence on concentration and led to higher 
price cost margin. More generally, the efficiency of Korea’s pre-crisis FDI 
policy appears questionable. While FDI turned out to be positive for the 
sectors in which it was allowed because it helped develop and upgrade 
Korea’s industrial structure, the lack of competition also proved harmful. In 
particular, the restrictive stance taken by the Government vis-à-vis foreign 
investors in its attempt to protect domestic producers gave rise to an 
oligopolistic market structure dominated by large and excessively-
leveraged conglomerates engaging in risky behaviors. These various 
imbalances and excesses can be said to be the deep-rooted causes of the 
recent crisis. 
 
Post-crisis FDI  
 
Reforms  With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, Korean 
authorities, as well as firms, had to change course. As far as FDI is 
concerned, the liberalization move, which was already under way, gained 
renewed momentum as of 1998, and FDI was prioritized as a key 
component of the country’s revival strategy. In the wake of the crisis, 
Korea was sorely in need of inflows of foreign capital, whether in the form 
of portfolio or FDI. As a result, the country resolutely embarked on an 
active FDI-promoting strategy. FDI is now clearly favored over borrowing 
because it provides a more stable way of financing development. In 
addition, it has been shown to lower the odds of currency crashes (Park and 
Rhee, 1998; and Kim and Hwang, 1998).   
The Korean Government revised acts related to foreign investment and 
proposed a new Foreign Investment Promotion Act (in November 1998), 
which strongly emphasizes the liberalization of foreign investment, 
improvement of the investment incentive system, introduction of the 
ombudsman system, streamlining foreign investment notification 
procedure, and the establishment of one-stop service. The Korea Trade-
Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) established the Korea Investment 
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Service Center in July 1998, a one-stop service institution for foreign 
investors, which provides administrative support for investment as well as 
counseling services and post investment services. Virtually all business 
sectors are now open to foreign investors and FDI is subject to no specific 
restrictions provided it does not violate national security, public health and 
conservation of the environment. Out of a total of 1,121 industries of 
activity under the Korea Standard Industry Classification, 63 including 
public administration, diplomatic affairs and national defense are closed to 
foreign investment. Out of the 1,058 business areas, which are subject to 
foreign investment, two remain prohibited (radio, television and satellite 
broadcasting) and 24 are partially open to foreign investment. Different 
degrees of limitation on foreign equity participation or the exclusion of 
some business lines to foreign investment are the most common types of 
restriction found in these partially opened business sectors. 
While foreign investors and foreign-invested companies enjoy the same 
rights as local residents or locally-owned companies, unless otherwise 
legally specified, in some cases they enjoy even greater privileges in the 
form of tax incentives. Such is the case in particular, in the so-called FTZs. 
Gimpo, Songdo, and Youngjong Island have been given the status of such 
special economic zones. In July 2002, five additional special economic 
zones were created as part of a package of incentives to attract foreign 
companies to Korea.   
Finally, restrictions on shareholdings by foreign investors in some 
public enterprises have been abolished or significantly reduced. Ceilings on 
foreign equity ownership in the stock market have also been eliminated. 
More importantly perhaps, cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
and even hostile takeovers are now allowed, and foreign land ownership 
has been fully liberalized. Consequently, as of end-2001, foreign investors 
owned 36.6 per cent of equities listed on the main KSE, up from 30.1 per 
cent at the start of the year. The top ten blue chip companies are now over 
50 per cent foreign-invested, including SK Telecom, Posco, LG Electronics 
and Kookmin Bank (EIU, 2002).  
In brief, all the following types of FDI are now permitted: 
• establishing a new business.  
• acquiring shares from capital increases from an existing business.  
• acquiring existing shares in a business.  
• mergers and acquisitions.  
• long-term loans investments, (including investment in privately-owned 
business). 
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Trends  Since the crisis broke, FDI flows into Korea have increased 
sharply. This can be attributed to a combination of positive factors 
including a substantial depreciation of the local currency and asset values, 
an increased number of company offerings as a result of corporate 
restructuring and privatization of state-owned companies, and a more 
favorable investment environment as a result of the Government’s 
deregulation and liberalization drive. 
As Table 1 demonstrates, during the four years from 1998 to 2001, FDI 
flows into Korea totaled more than $27 billion (BoP data), or $52 billion 
(notification basis). A slowdown was however, observed in 2001 for the 
first time since 1992 (or 1993, depending on the series), suggesting that the 
post-crisis euphoria may be short-lived. It remains to be seen whether this 
is a turning point resulting from the slowdown in corporate and financial 
restructuring or simply the result of a temporarily less positive global 
environment. The rising competition from China, as an alternative location 
for FDI, is also perceived as a major matter of concern and a potential 
cause of the observed slowdown. Yet the rebound observed in early 2002 is 
an encouraging sign. 
With respect to industrial distribution, although the service sector has 
maintained a strong momentum, the manufacturing sector is still dominant. 
As Table 3 illustrates, finance and insurance excel in the services sector, 
while electric and electronics makes up the largest share among 
manufacturing industries. This can be attributed to the Government’s will 
to attract FDI to help maintain the competitiveness of these sectors. A good 
example is the joint venture between Philips and LG Electronics in 1999.   
The surge of FDI in manufacturing has been sustained since the crisis, 
with rather contrasting evolutions across industries. FDI is no doubt 
increasingly used as an instrument for restructuring. The government 
ascribes the continuing robust nature of inbound capital to the recovery of 
the international credibility of the Korean economy, the progress of its 
ongoing corporate restructuring program, and the new environment of 
opportunity in the investment regime created by the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Act. According to a study by KPMG, foreign companies, which 
initially exported to Korea through local agents or engaged in joint 
ventures with local companies, were found to have expanded their FDI 
during the crisis, probably because their Korean partners hoped to boost 
their liquidity this way.  
The rising share of the finance and insurance industries is related to the 
strong progress in the restructuring of the financial sector and to the 
Government’s easing of foreign investment restrictions in financial services 
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and insurance industries. An increased foreign presence can clearly be 
found in the financial sector and foreign financial institutions advancing 
into Korea’s market are now placing more emphasis on capital investment 
and acquisition of existing institutions rather than on establishment of 
branches. While the financial sector is particularly attractive thanks to the 
sweeping clean-up drive to remove insolvency, other sectors such as 
construction and transport were particularly severely hit by the crisis. The 
increase in domestic demand has also brought about an increase in FDI 
flows into wholesale and retail trade industries.  
The post-crisis surge in FDI involves a different mix of foreign 
investors, with a larger diversification in the sources of FDI than was the 
case in the past. Although US investors are still dominant, European 
investors account for a relatively large share, while Japanese investors lost 
ground as a result, most probably, of the country’s persistent economic and 
financial crisis (see Table 4).  
With regard to the size of investment projects, the proportion of 
investments of less than $5 million has steadily increased, suggesting that 
FDI is much more diffuse than was the case in the past. Cross-border 
M&As (mostly involving buying out joint venture partners, existing 
investors expanding through acquisitions, and creation of new 
establishments in collaboration with Korean partners to acquire existing 
business units) rose dramatically in Korea in the wake of the financial 
crisis from $836 million in 1997 to $3973, $10062 and $6448 million in 
1998, 1999, and 2000 respectively (UNCTAD, 2001). Korea was the most 
targeted economy for cross-border M&A in Asia (excluding Japan and 
China) in 2001, attracting $13.83 billion worth of foreign investment from 
79 deals (South China Morning Post, January, 2nd, 2002). Prominent 
transactions included the $2.77 billion purchase of SK Telecom by Signum 
IX. This evolution is due to the deregulation of hostile M&As, and also to 
lower asset prices and to the sharp depreciation of the won. Target 
enterprises have been accepting foreign capital participation in order to 
secure ready cash. Selling off even lucrative and core business divisions 
over their more marginal ones has proved an effective means of tackling 
the financial crunch resulting from a loss of creditworthiness. Such was the 
case of BASF’s purchase of a new lysine-manufacturing unit from Daesang 
group (Kim, 1999).  
The rise in FDI in services described earlier is also driven by the 
opening up of industries such as telecommunications and electricity, which 
were traditionally in the hands of the public sector. Among the 11 public 
enterprises designated for privatization, 6 (including POSCO) have already 
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been successfully privatized, while the remaining 5 are in the process of 
being privatized. Yet so far, these firms have attracted more portfolio than 
FDI, with the exception of KEPCO, which sold two generation plants to an 
international consortium (Yun 2001).  
 
Assessment  
 
Expected benefits and potential risks  The recent surge of FDI into Korea is 
largely due to the more positive policy stance towards foreign investors. 
Opening up the economy to FDI may serve different purposes. First, FDI is 
a source of finance. Second, FDI can help firms streamline their activities. 
Third, FDI can contribute to the restructuring process to the extent that the 
presence of foreign firms can encourage the adoption of international best 
practice and promote better corporate governance, in particular by reducing 
the degree of public interventionism (Yun and Lee, 2001). In the case of 
Korea, the rationale for attracting more FDI is to be found at the 
microeconomic level rather than at the macroeconomic level. 
The dramatic change in Korea’s policies and attitudes toward FDI will 
definitely affect the way the Korean economy operates and interacts with 
the rest of the world economy. In particular the lifting of a number of 
restrictions on the participation of foreign firms will expose the chaebols to 
fiercer competition, while enhancing a more transparent business 
environment.  
Of course, next to these opportunities, the surge of FDI may also 
generate a number of risks. The first major concern is that domestic firms 
may be acquired at low price (fire-sale). Second, is the fear of dominance 
by foreigners (ownership issue). Third, is the potential for domestic 
monopolies to be substituted by foreign monopolies.  
 
Where does Korea stand?  Despite the dramatic rise in FDI inflows, Korea 
still does not attract a large amount of FDI relative to the size of its 
economy and lags very much behind other comparable economies. 
According to UNCTAD (2001), Korea is among under-performers in terms 
of attracting FDI. In 2000, its proportion of FDI stock (on arrival basis) to 
GDP was just 8.9 per cent, which is quite low compared to the average of 
23.3 per cent in East Asia and 13.7 per cent for the world average. There is 
thus still scope for further expansion of FDI if Korea is to reach the degree 
of internationalization observed in comparable economies. An important 
point to note is that the different capital inflows to Korea are now better 
balanced, with non debt-creating flows now clearly dominant.  
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Yet FDI inflows have no doubt already deeply affected the Korean 
economy, and should continue to do so in the future, in the following way:  
• FDI helped firms to survive while they were on the brink of collapse in 
the wake of the crisis. When cash-rich companies took over ailing Korean 
firms, hundreds of jobs that might otherwise have disappeared were 
salvaged, not only at the firms concerned but also at their subcontractors 
and suppliers. Critics may perceive some acquisitions negatively because 
foreigners may acquire a large market share. This is probably the case for 
the seeds industry, with Seminis controlling about 45 per cent of the 
Korean vegetable seed market. But the important point is to compare the 
current situation with the counterfactual. Acquisition by foreigners ensured 
the survival of firms that would otherwise exit the market, and as a result 
these acquisitions exert a competition-enhancing effect.  
• Beyond this first short-term impact, major changes already took place 
and reflect a real change of mindset. As FDI is expected to favor structural 
change, a self-reinforcing mechanism may come into play through which 
structural change stimulates FDI to Korea, and FDI to Korea accelerates 
the speed of structural changes. As a result, the Korean economy is likely 
to be increasingly in line with other OECD economies. Structural changes 
include (i) changing the safety net mechanism in the financial system; (ii) 
changes in corporate governance of Korean companies triggered by 
changes in the financial system (increasing share of foreign equity holders, 
hence a rise in the required rate of return for the firms, and a shift to the 
globally accepted level playing field); (iii) recent focus on business 
restructuring for the purpose of improving profitability; (iv) increasing 
transparency of Korean companies as a result of reinforced disclosure 
requirements; and (v) a series of deregulation initiatives lowering or 
eliminating barriers to new entrants.  
• As was the case in the past, FDI continues to make a significant 
contribution to export growth. Research undertaken by KIET (2002) 
suggests that exports of foreign manufacturing companies in Korea 
accounted for about 15 per cent of the country’s total exports in 1999. The 
trade surplus generated by these companies reached 20.3 per cent of 
Korea’s total trade surplus. All this means that these firms’ contribution to 
export performance is much larger than what their share of total production 
would suggest (Korea Times 17.01.02). As one of the top-selling foreign 
companies in Korea, Nokia (which became the 10th largest exporting 
company in the country in 1999) more than doubled its exports of mobile 
phones from 1995 to 1998 (to $1 billion) and again in 2000 (to $2.4 
billion). 
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• FDI also increasingly helps in developing the components industry and 
in reducing the dependence on imports from Japan. Investment by an Italian 
consortium (Ultratec) aimed at producing printed circuit boards (PCB) and 
PCB manufacturing equipment is a good example of such a new trend. This 
move should help reduce the country’s dependence on imports. Active 
Government policies seek to promote the creation and deepening of 
linkages between MNEs and local suppliers (so as to raise the efficiency of 
production and contribute to the diffusion of knowledge and skills from 
MNEs to the local enterprise sector). Specific measures were put in place 
in order to maximize the potential benefits of FDI inflows. For instance, the 
Government encourages big companies (including foreign affiliates) to help 
organize small and medium sized enterprises’ (SMEs) supplier associations 
and participate in their training and other programs (UNCTAD, 2001).  
• FDI may also play an important role in the privatization process. 
Through this channel, it can have a number of positive impacts. First, by 
providing the much needed financial means for the privatization of State-
Owned Enterprises. Second, by ensuring continued steady influx of foreign 
exchange in the form of follow-up investments for maintenance and 
expansion. Third, by highlighting the government’s openness policy to 
foreigners. Also, privatization-related FDI can act as a catalyst and induce 
additional foreign investment in non-privatized industries. Finally the 
inclusion of foreign investors in the bidding process may push up the price 
of the entity being privatized. Yet, the success of the privatization process 
is mixed so far. In order to attract foreign investors to participate in 
privatization, Korea has to ensure coherent principles and enhanced 
transparency of regulations (Korea Times, 13.9.01).  
• The contribution of FDI is also substantial in transferring not so much 
technology but organizational skills and managerial know-how. Volvo 
Korea (a result of Sweden’s Volvo take over of Samsung’s construction-
equipment division in February 1998) is a good example where an MNC 
helped change the management system of a Korean firm. Under Volvo’s 
influence, the administrative process of the Korean subsidiary has been 
rationalized and transparency has been enhanced (see Kim, 1999). 
Generally, changes in strategy from growth orientation to profit orientation 
can be observed under the pressure of foreign investors (Rhee 1999). Large 
firms are increasingly withdrawing from diversified activities, while they 
tend to focus on the business in which they have a competitive advantage.  
Changes of a similar nature can be observed in the financial sector. As a 
result of the change in the form of foreign involvement in the financial 
sector, foreigners are now participating actively in the management of 
FDI as a factor of economic restructuring: The case of South Korea  23 
 
banks, leading to substantial changes in lending practices in particular. The 
refusal of the new foreign management of Korea First Bank to participate 
in the government-organized bailout of Hyundai and other large Korean 
corporations in January 2001 may be seen as a promising development. 
Similarly, since the takeover by Germany’s Commerzbank, Korea 
Exchange Bank has reduced its exposure to high-risk corporate giants like 
Daewoo, improved its lending practices and strengthened the credit 
analysis by its staff (Park, 2000). For more details on the impact of foreign 
involvement in the Korean banking and financial sectors, see Nicolas 
(2002).  
• There is still inconclusive evidence on the pro- or anti-competitive 
impact of FDI (Yun, 2001). On the one hand, the rise in FDI inflows led to 
substantial concentration in some industries such as the paper industry 
(Yun and Lee, 2001). On the other hand, thanks to increased foreign 
penetration, there is a likely erosion of the power of the chaebols in a 
number of industries including the retail trade industry. Korea has 
traditionally had a manufacturer-dominated structure in retail industry in 
which manufacturing firms not only produce but also participate in retail 
sales as dominant players (Kim 1999). As a result of the liberalization drive 
that gained momentum after the crisis, the market structure has been 
changed and large-sized discount stores or hyper-markets established by 
foreign retailers (Makro, Carrefour, Wal-Mart) are now competing with the 
chaebol manufacturers. More generally, the number of industries in which 
foreign companies have more than 50 per cent of the total market share is 
consistently on the rise. As a result, the nature of competition has changed, 
shifting from competition among domestic companies to competition 
between MNEs and domestic companies.  
• Finally, FDI may be helping turn Korea into a regional hub. Korea is 
perceived by a number of foreign investors as the gateway to the East Asian 
market. For instance, most French firms perceive Korea in such a way and 
try to take advantage of the regional market, in the fine chemicals industry.   
In a nutshell, rising FDI is having two major types of impacts on the 
Korean economy. First, FDI helped economic recovery in the short-run by 
providing cash and maintaining competitiveness and keeping some firms 
afloat. Second, FDI is having a longer-lasting contribution to economic 
efficiency through demonstration effects, through adoption of international 
standards in business practices and promotion of better corporate 
governance, and through enhanced competition. FDI helps industrial 
restructuring and changes the way the Korean economy operates, in 
particular by modifying the nature of competition and the relationship 
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between business and government. As a result, rationalization can be 
observed in many respects, primarily in the financial sphere. The 
contribution of FDI is different than in the past. The impact is no longer on 
the pattern of specialization of the economy but rather on the way the 
Korean economy is working. In other words, FDI can be said to have today 
more of an impact on the ‘software’ than on the ‘hardware’ of the Korean 
economy.  
 
 
Outward FDI  
 
Pre-crisis OFDI 
 
Policies  In the 1970s exports were the favored means of 
internationalization for the Korean manufacturing sector. Moreover, 
because it was considered as a capital outflow, outward FDI (OFDI) was 
discouraged by the Government except in special cases for facilitating 
export or securing a stable supply of important raw materials (ESCAP 
1998). Until the 1980s OFDI was thus restricted to a limited number of 
activities. During the late-1980s, however there was a change of direction 
in the country’s OFDI policy not only as a result of the emergence of a 
current account surplus but also in the wake of the liberalization of foreign 
exchange transactions. Aggressive measures were put in place in order to 
help declining industries regain competitiveness by relocating overseas in 
low-wage countries or to help more high-tech industries jump over the 
protectionist barriers imposed by industrial countries or get access to 
foreign technology.  
Some initial steps were taken as early as 1981. For instance, restrictions 
on investor qualifications were eased, prior authorization of investment 
projects was abolished, the requirement of recovering the invested principal 
within 10 years was removed, and the approval procedure was widely 
simplified. Yet genuine liberalization did not materialize before 1987. In 
particular, the adoption of the notification system allowed firms to invest 
abroad simply by notifying the Bank of Korea. Investor qualifications were 
also further simplified. As a result of the liberalization only 14 business 
categories remained restricted for outward investment. The government 
even allowed overseas real estate investments, which had so far been 
regarded as proscribed practice (Kim and Kim, 1997).  
The return of the deficit in 1990 did not stall the OFDI liberalization 
move and the promotion of OFDI stood as one of the objectives of the 
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Seventh Five-Year plan (1992-97). Liberalization was still getting ahead, 
with relaxed conditions for approval and a shift in February 1994 to a 
negative list system (as a result OFDI was possible in all business 
categories except for those on the negative list). OFDI liberalization as part 
of the segyehwa policy encapsulated in the Seventh Five-year plan 
represents the government’s recognition of the need for greater integration 
into the world economy and continues the strong tradition of close 
collaboration between the government and the private sector (in particular 
the chaebols). An important strategic objective of the segyhewa policy is to 
enhance independent technological capability, and OFDI is seen as a way 
of improving competitiveness. Perhaps, this is in recognition that Korea’s 
technological dependency remains a major structural weakness (Dent and 
Randerson 1996).  
At the same time, the Government grew increasingly worried about 
possible negative impacts of booming OFDI on the home economy. 
Prudential regulations were thus introduced in 1995 as an allegedly 
precautionary measure to induce more careful planning and healthy 
management of OFDI and thereby prevent any adverse side-effects arising 
from its liberalization. Among other things, the Government introduced a 
minimum self-funding requirement of 10 per cent of the OFDI amount for 
the local subsidiaries with financial assistance of less than $100 million. 
This ratio rises to 20 per cent if the investment exceeds $100 million. This 
regulation, which is paralleled by similar provisions at the domestic level, 
reflects the willingness of the Government to tightly monitor the economy. 
Rather than restricting investment abroad, it is aimed at preventing firm 
managers from taking undue risks, which would ultimately be at the 
expense of shareholders and creditors, particularly domestic banks. These 
measures were supposedly taken in response to poor performance of OFDI 
in some countries and the sharp increase in large-scale OFDI projects (Kim 
and Wang, 1996). It is also worthwhile noting that it has been typical of the 
Korean economy that such an initiative should be taken by the Government 
and not left to the private sector through enhancement of good corporate 
governance.   
 
Trends  OFDI from Korea started in the late-1950s in the service sector 
(with a mining company investing in New York real estate), in 1968 with a 
forestry development project in Indonesia, and in 1974 in manufacturing. 
Yet OFDI did not experience strong rates of growth until the second half of 
the 1980s when Korea gradually gained economic clout (see Figure 2). The 
total value of stock investment abroad rose from $0.65 billion in 1986 to 
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$10.2 billion in 1995.  
In the early stages, OFDI was oriented towards Asia, North America, 
and the Middle East. In terms of industries, OFDI was mainly concentrated 
in agriculture, manufacturing, trade, and construction. Within the 
manufacturing sector, the large share devoted to the petrochemical industry 
(see Table 5) reflects the country’s dependence on such resources. Within 
Asia, OFDI was primarily directed to Indonesia to gain access to timber 
supplies for the Korean plywood industries. In the Middle East by contrast, 
the bulk of OFDI was directed to Saudi Arabia and sought to take 
advantage of the construction boom.  
Over the period 1981-90 OFDI in mining gained importance, next to 
manufacturing and trade. This is because as a resource-poor country, Korea 
is totally dependent on raw material and energy imports. Within 
manufacturing, electronics emerged (with 7 per cent) while textiles and 
transport equipment started to loom large (next to petrochemicals), with 
about 15 per cent each of total manufacturing OFDI. Yet, basic metals 
commanded the largest share (about 24 per cent). The rise in OFDI in basic 
metals products resulted primarily from a large investment of POSCO in 
the US. In terms of destination, North America was a privileged destination 
in the 1980s, ahead of Asia. The real take off of OFDI in the late-1980s 
(with an average annual growth of 77 per cent) was accompanied by a shift 
in the destination, with neighboring Asian economies becoming major 
targets. 
In the immediate pre-crisis period, OFDI was overwhelmingly 
concentrated in manufacturing, with close to 60 per cent of the total for the 
period 1991-97 up from less than 20 per cent in the period 1968-80. In 
terms of stock, manufacturing accounted for 53 per cent of OFDI position 
in 1997 compared to 33 per cent ten years earlier. This suggests that 
restructuring of the domestic industry is gaining importance over access to 
natural resources as a motive for OFDI. According to Lee and Plummer 
(1992), OFDI, both to developing and industrialized countries, is found to 
originate largely from those sectors in which Korea has proven its 
competitive advantages in world markets. The primary goal of OFDI is to 
maintain export dynamism be it through relocation of export production or 
through export-preserving in OECD countries. This results again from the 
heavy emphasis initially placed on export-oriented production in Korea. 
OFDI in trading activities is also particularly large in the US and the EU, 
while it is relatively unimportant in Asia, underlining the importance of 
Asia as a production location rather than a target market (Hoesel, 1999).  
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Table 5 Industrial Distribution of OFDI, 1968-2001 (%) 
 
 1962-80 1981-90 1991-97 1998-
2001 
Agriculture/Fishery/Forestry 24.7 6.8 0.3 0.4 
Mining 1.1 20.5 4.6 2.5 
Manufacturing 19.1 47.9 59.6 45.3 
Food 2.1 3.2 2.1 1.2 
Textile and Clothing 0.9 7.4 7.7 3.9 
Shoes and Leather 1.1 2.0 1.9 0.8 
Wood and Furniture 0.2 1.2 1.0 0.3 
Paper and Printing 1.1 1.8 1.1 0.5 
Petrochemicals 5.9 4.8 4.1 5.5 
Non-metallic Minerals 1.9 1.8 2.5 0.0 
Primary Metals 2.6 11.3 4.5 1.0 
Fabricated Metals 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.1 
Machinery and Equipment 0.0 0.6 5.5 4.5 
Electronic Communication Equipment 0.0 3.5 18.8 20.3 
Transport Equipment 0.0 7.0 6.5 5.6 
Others 3.2 1.8 2.8 1.5 
Service 55.1 24.9 35.4 51.8 
Construction 18.9 1.2 2.0 1.6 
Wholesale and Retail 22.6 18.1 17.5 28.4 
Transport and Warehousing 1.8 0.2 0.9 0.5 
Telecommunication 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 
Barking and Insurance 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.7 3.6 3.7 0.9 
Real Estate Service 10.1 1.6 5.5 20.2 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: EXIM Bank, Overseas Direct Investment Yearbook 2002.  
Note: The calculations are based on net invested amounts.  
 
Within manufacturing, a breakdown by industry shows that transport 
equipment, together with electronics and telecommunications equipment 
account for the largest share (more than 40 per cent) of OFDI, while 
textiles and clothing simply account for about 13 per cent, and basic metal 
products dropped below 8 per cent. Leading Korean electric and electronics 
firms generated the recent surge in the machinery sector OFDI, investing 
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initially in the US and eventually in other countries.  
In terms of location, OFDI is primarily concentrated in Asia and in the 
US, these two regions accounted for more than 75 per cent share during the 
period 1991-97 (see Table 6). Yet Europe’s share has been strongly on the 
rise lately, up to almost 15 per cent for the period 1991-97 from 4 per cent 
in 1968-80. Europe was ahead of the US as a destination for Korean OFDI 
in 1995.  
 
 
Table 6 Destination of Korean OFDI, 1968-2001 (%) 
 
 1968-1980 1981-1990 1991-1997 1998-2001a 
Asia 29.4 29.5 48.8 28.8 
Middle East 16.6 1.6 0.5 0.5 
North America 24.4 69.6 27.1 31.0 
Latin America 3.5 6.8 4.5 5.9 
Europe 3.9 5.1 14.4 30.8 
Africa 18.9 1.0 2.2 1.4 
Oceania 3.3 6.8 2.1 2.1 
Sources: Export-Import Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct investment Statistics 
Yearbook, 2002.  
Note:  For this period, the calculation is done excluding investments in Bermuda. 
The calculations are based on net invested amounts.   
 
 
Assessment  
 
During the period 1960-80, Korean enterprises cannot be said to have 
generated ownership specific advantages to make OFDI possible. The only 
exception may be with Korean investments in the construction industry in 
the Middle-East. In this case, Korean firms were exporting technology, 
labor and management (Dunning, 1981). In general, until the early 1980s, 
Korean OFDI can be said to have been primarily of the resource-seeking 
kind (Lee and Plummer, 1992) and to a limited extent of the market-
seeking kind. The deliberate limitation to the growth of the home market 
created an additional incentive for Korean firms to move abroad.  
The major push in OFDI in the mid-1980s was perhaps partly fuelled by 
the chaebols’ desire to reduce their reliance on domestic sales to enable 
them to service their debts, the heavy debt burden being a legacy of Park 
Chung-Hee’s soft loan policies. Korean OFDI is also related to structural 
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changes (rising domestic wages, appreciating won and strong business 
interests to enhance market share and increase profits) taking place in the 
Korean economy as well as to changes in policy (liberalization after the 
current account surplus). The high degree of OFDI from Korea in the 
recent period is to be linked to the active home government encouragement 
of firms with limited international experience (Narula, 1996). Extensive 
support is given to potential overseas investors by means of financial help 
and tax incentives. Moreover, the traditional rivalry among the chaebols 
probably also strengthened the trend.  
Depending on the location of OFDI, there are basically four major 
motives for OFDI by Korean firms: to relocate industries in order to gain 
cost advantages or to circumvent trade barriers; to secure stable supplies of 
industrial resources; to facilitate trade or promote exports; and to 
accommodate the need for global networking. The motives for OFDI vary 
across destinations and their relative importance has changed over time as 
Korea’s industrial structure changed. Also, as can be seen in figures 3 and 
4, the situation is different for declining and growing industries: OFDI may 
substitute for exports in the former case and complement them in the latter.  
 
Korean OFDI in Asia as a response to eroding comparative advantages  A 
particular feature of Korean OFDI in Asia is the radical transition in terms 
of its pattern, turning away from the resource-seeking of the 1970s and 
mid-1980s to small-scale, export-oriented, labor-intensive profit-
maximizing, particularly in such industries as textiles, footwear, garments 
and chemical industries (Lee, 1997). The erosion of Korea’s comparative 
advantages was no doubt the primary driver of Korean OFDI in developing 
Asia. The high export dependency of the major Korean manufacturing 
industries led domestic firms to seek overseas investments as a means to 
survive the various threats to their export markets (Lee, 1997). Moreover 
the loss of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status further 
induced Korean firms to relocate in neighboring less advanced countries 
such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and eventually China to take 
advantage of these countries’ quotas in industrialized countries’ imports. 
As income levels in Korea rose and approached those of industrial 
countries, the latter began abolishing special treatment granted to Korean 
exports in their markets under the GSP. Korea was knocked off the list 
eligible for inclusion in the GSP by the US in 1988 and by the EU in 1989 
as part of a wide array of measures aimed at reducing their trade deficits 
with Korea. In Korea, because economic growth had been export-driven so 
far, the only way to maintain the production momentum was through OFDI 
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expansion in lower-wage economies. Such investments can be said to result 
from strong ownership advantages in the form of management techniques 
and production processes adapted to third world conditions. 
In this respect Korean OFDI fits rather well with the standard 
explanation of the shift from export activities to overseas production in the 
framework of the product cycle model. This is confirmed by Figure 4, 
which shows a substitution between exports and production abroad in the 
textiles and clothing industry. As was the case in Japan, the success of 
export-led industrialization in Korean economic development, made the 
next stage, capital export, inevitable (Lee, 1997), in particular in countries 
further down the line.  
 
Figure 4 Textiles and Clothing: Exports, FDI, OFDI, 1961-2000. 
 
While Korean OFDI in developing Asia tended to be single factor 
dominated, namely seeking cheap labor for export-oriented production in 
the 1980s, local market-motivated investments have been on the rise since 
the early 1990s, in particular in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries such as Malaysia. This is reflected in a sectoral shift in 
the composition of OFDI away from apparel, leather goods, footwear and 
miscellaneous manufacturing to fabricated metal products or machinery 
and equipment industries.  
The re-emergence of Asia as the major host region for Korean OFDI in 
the 1990s also reflects the growing importance of export-oriented 
manufacturing investment in outward-oriented second-tier exporting 
economies in Asia. In this respect the surge of Korean OFDI in the region 
is the result of strong pull factors and not exclusively of the push factors 
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highlighted above. Within Asia, while Indonesia remains a privileged 
destination for Korean OFDI, China has recently risen as the primary target 
of Korean investors, accounting for as much as 20 per cent of total OFDI 
over the period 1992-98. There is little doubt that state policies and 
institutional conditions in these host countries played a large role. In 
particular, it is important to recognize that the rapid increase of Korean 
OFDI in manufacturing in Indonesia or China coincides with massive 
economic reforms aimed at securing and attracting foreign capital (Lee, 
1997; and OECD, 1999). As shown by Park and Lee (2001), Korean firms 
in China aimed at using this country as an export-processing base and not 
at targeting the local market. Also they focused on labor-intensive sectors 
over which they had some ownership advantages exploiting cheap labor 
and raw materials. The pattern of Korean OFDI in Eastern and Central 
European economies (such as Poland or Romania), in former USSR 
Republics (such as Uzbekistan), in Mediterranean countries (such as 
Turkey), or in Mexico closely resembles what was observed in developing 
Asia. In these countries, the primary motive of Korean ODI is clearly 
seeking cheap-labor so as to improve price competitiveness.    
 
Korean OFDI in OECD countries as a means of preserving market shares 
and upgrading  A major characteristic of recent Korean OFDI is its heavy 
involvement in OECD countries, relative to what can be observed in 
comparable NIEs such as Taiwan. By contrast to what was observed for 
Korean OFDI into Asia, shifting comparative advantages cannot possibly 
account for Korean OFDI into OECD countries. The bulk of Korean OFDI 
in OECD countries is concentrated in manufacturing (about 50 per cent), 
with trading activities as the second largest sector (30-35 per cent). Within 
manufacturing, more than half of Korean OFDI in OECD countries is in the 
machinery and equipment sector (including electronics), definitely not 
seeking cheap labor in these countries. In an empirical analysis of the 
Korean electronics industry, Hoesel (1999) highlights the differences in the 
determinants of Korean OFDI in Asia and in OECD countries. 
Protectionism and the overall quality of human capital embodied in a firm 
are shown to play a role in the latter case but not in the former. In the same 
vein, Lee (2002) also stresses the different motives for Korean OFDI in 
Asia and in OECD countries and finds that expansion of local sales is a 
particularly important motive in the latter case. 
Korean OFDI in OECD countries appears to seek two things. First it is 
purported to defend export market shares and cope with import restrictions. 
Second, it seeks advanced technology from developed countries, as 
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evidenced by some Korean investment and acquisitions in Silicon Valley.  
The surge of OFDI to OECD countries may be partly attributed to rising 
protectionism against Korean products in these economies. Apparently, the 
increase in trade barriers in OECD markets tended to raise internalization 
advantages sufficiently to more than compensate for locational 
disadvantages or lack of locational advantages in OECD economies and 
thus induce the Korean firms to invest in OECD countries (Lee and 
Plummer, 1992). For instance about 80 per cent of the total Korean OFDI 
stock in the EU is concentrated in the electronics industry, and more 
precisely in those products where Korean chaebols have a strong advantage 
in the world market, namely brown goods (TV sets, VTRs), some white 
goods (micro-wave ovens, AC), components (semi-conductors, cathode 
tubes), and office equipment. This high concentration reflects the attempt 
by Korean firms to respond to protectionist threats or measures, which are 
greatest for consumer electronics products. Another factor tends to confirm 
this hypothesis. Many Korean OFDI cases in electrical and electronic 
goods are for the production of intermediate goods, which would increase 
the local contents of Korean products in foreign markets.  
Because Korea’s efforts to spend more on R&D may not suffice to make 
its firms more innovative, Korean MNEs also resorted to M&A in 
industrial economies to gain access to cutting-edge technologies. Hyundai 
has been the most aggressive investor of this kind with its acquisition of 
Axil computer for instance (Woo 1999). OFDI perceived as a means of 
acquiring assets through strategic asset seeking investments is clearly less a 
function of home country advantages and more of host country advantages. 
These investments are to some extent complementary to market-retaining 
investments to the extent that they are expected to help enhance the 
competitiveness of the investing firm. The stake taken by Samsung 
Electronics in US computer firm AST was obviously aimed at 
strengthening its position in information systems, as well as at improving 
its brand name and distribution systems (Dunning et al, 1998). Other 
examples include the acquisition by LG Electronics of Zenith Electronics, 
the last TV producer in the US. The failed attempt by Daewoo to take over 
the consumer electronics part of Thomson France had exactly the same 
objective. 
An additional reason for the expansion of Korean OFDI in the Triad has 
to do with the need to develop marketing capabilities. If non-manufacturing 
OFDI is included into the analysis, the largest number of Korean projects in 
OECD regions was to set up foreign trading companies. The combination 
of locally-made intermediate goods and expanded marketing channels is 
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expected to contribute to defend or increase Korean products’ shares in 
OECD markets. This situation has to do with the prevalence of original 
equipment manufacture arrangements in the past:  Under such agreements, 
Korean firms were not induced to develop global brand names or 
distribution channels.  
As a result, Korean OFDI in advanced countries cannot be said to be 
systematically based on any strong ownership advantage of Korean 
producers. Rather, it seeks to defend Korean shares in local markets in 
response to rising protectionism or to learn from foreign partners. A 
number of authors (Lee and Lee, 1992; and Lee, 1994) argue that most of 
these OFDI flows into OECD countries result from a ‘premature strategic 
move’. This OFDI also does not result from economic restructuring or 
industrial upgrading. To the contrary it can be interpreted as a means of 
reaching such goals. In other words, far from being the result of Korea’s 
industrial upgrading, OFDI is partly used to help and ease industrial 
upgrading.  
 
Excessive or problematic OFDI   The pace of Korean OFDI expansion was 
perceived by some authors as the sign that these investments may be 
excessive. The failure of a number of large ventures, such as Hyundai’s 
failed investment experience in Canada followed by the closure of its 
facility in 1993, confirm these concerns. Further signs suggest that some of 
these investments may not have been fully sound. First, the returns on 
investment by foreign subsidiaries are often found to be quite weak. Of 
course, such a result may be related to the asset-seeking orientation of these 
investments, as well as to the immaturity of Korean OFDI. Yet, the 
financial soundness of Korean ODI is also questionable, with excessive 
foreign borrowings as standard practice. As reported in Lee (2000), the 
financial stability of the foreign subsidiaries of Korean firms was found to 
be extremely weak in a study conducted by KIEP in 1997. Because of the 
guarantees provided by parent companies or member companies, the 
vulnerability of the subsidiaries may also threaten the whole group, as was 
clearly demonstrated in the case of Daewoo.  
Public policies can probably account for the apparently excessive extent 
of some Korean OFDI, with the worldwide expansion of Daewoo as a case 
in point. Under a ‘global management’ strategy launched in 1990, Daewoo 
has been pursuing a daring international expansion at a breakneck speed, 
with investments ranging from textiles to electronics and components, 
heavy industries, autos, and natural resources, in locations such as China, 
Vietnam, Russia, Hong Kong, Britain, Poland, Uzbekistan, Libya, Sudan or 
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Angola. As a result, in 1998 Daewoo was included in the world’s 100 
largest transnational corporations. Public policies certainly played a role in 
this expansion in many ways. First, Korean authorities provided financial 
support to potential outward investors. Moreover the bulk of these 
investments is due to the chaebols, whose emergence was the clear result of 
former public policies. In their foreign ventures, the chaebols simply 
reproduced the type of strategy they followed at home. And there can be 
little doubt that they adopted riskier strategies than they would do in the 
absence of helping hands in the form of rescue loans from the Government. 
Moreover, because of the traditional race among the chaebols, there is a 
clear risk that the chaebols may overstretch themselves.  
 
Post-crisis OFDI  
 
Policies and trends  Although OFDI is again perceived nowadays as a 
possible drain on Korea’s resources, there was no major change in policy 
provisions to restrict its scope. To the contrary, certain requirements on 
self-financing were relaxed in August 1997, while the prior approval 
system was finally abolished in October 1997. Yet,  in the wake of the 
crisis, policies imposing restructuring measures to the chaebols, as well as 
various regulatory restrictions in terms of indebtedness and diversification 
of activities may have a negative impact on OFDI flows. The bankruptcies 
of a number of large industrial groups account for the divestments or the 
scaling down of projects. In particular Daewoo Motor and Daewoo 
Electronics closed down a large number of their overseas production units 
over the past two years.  
As could be expected, since 1997, the financial crisis has taken its toll 
on the wave of Korean OFDI, which had assumed such a high profile in 
recent years. As a result, Korean OFDI has slowed down since 1998, as can 
be seen in the consistent drop in the OFDI to GDP ratio (Figure 2). In 
absolute terms, the upward trend which had started in the late 80s stopped 
abruptly in 1997 but there was only a slight fall in the amount of 
investment. This initially limited drop can be explained by the rise in 
additional investment by parent companies in their foreign subsidiaries in 
order to compensate for their inability to roll over their short-term 
borrowings or access new funds in the local financial markets. According 
to the Exim Bank, however, there is as yet no clear trend beyond the initial 
stagnation: OFDI recovered in 2000, before slowing down again in 2001. In 
spite of the dramatic improvement in Korea’s economic situation, 
divestments have been quite large, and a number of foreign ventures have 
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been closed down. In 2001, these negative flows totaled $1.3 billion, 
leading to a sharp drop in the net total investments from $3.7 billion to $1.9 
billion (Exim Bank, 2002).   
 
New OFDI patterns  Since the crisis, the share of the service sector has 
been on the rise at the expense of manufacturing. While wholesale trade 
and retail, as well as the real estate industry have been major beneficiaries 
within the tertiary sector, textiles and clothing, as well as wood and 
furniture or basic metal industries have been major victims of the drop in 
the share of manufacturing OFDI. By contrast, electronics and telecom 
equipment, and petroleum and chemicals proved resilient. Active overseas 
investment in the R&D and software areas also account for the rise in the 
share of the service industry in the recent period (Ha, 2002).  
Also, the relative erosion in the weight of the chaebols may help reduce 
the rivalry which fuelled some excessive investments in the past, and also 
lead to a better balance between OFDI by the chaebols and by SMEs.  
More importantly perhaps, there has been to a large extent a 
geographical redistribution in OFDI, away from Asia, towards the US and 
to some extent Europe. In fact, Europe managed to improve its position 
mainly thanks to a large investment realized jointly by LG Electronics and 
Philips in 2001. Within Europe, Central and Eastern European countries 
such as Poland or Hungary loom large by contrast to Western European 
countries, with the exception of the UK and the Netherlands. The drop in 
the share of Asia needs to be qualified however. First, in terms of accepted 
investments, Asia remains the main destination of Korean OFDI (if the year 
2001 is excluded). Second, the observed relative decline does not mean that 
Korean OFDI dropped in all countries. To the contrary, China is attracting 
increasing amounts of investments, at the expense of other Asian countries 
such as Indonesia. Yet, even if China overtook the US as the main magnet 
for Korean OFDI in 1998, over the period 1997-2001, it only managed to 
attract about $1 billion (less than 10 per cent of total Korean OFDI), 
compared to the US’ $3 billion (about 30 per cent).  
Obviously, one of the motivations of Korean OFDI into China is 
resource-seeking. Both large, and small- and medium-sized Korean firms 
rushed into China, primarily in order to take advantage of cheap labor and 
maintain their price competitiveness on export markets. According to the 
Exim Bank of Korea, SMEs account for 54 per cent of total Korean 
investment in China. Moreover, the bulk of these investments is taking 
place in manufacturing. Yet, Korean firms may also be attracted by the 
potential growth of the Chinese market. Such is probably the case in 
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industries where Korean producers are competitive, such as mobile 
telecommunications, automobile or electronic communication equipment. 
By contrast, in the case of Korean OFDI to the US, the major motivation is 
to circumvent various trade barriers such as anti-dumping measures. 
 
Assessment  
 
Temporary slowdown or permanent change? A key question is whether the 
drop in Korean OFDI is a temporary phenomenon related to the crisis-
induced financial difficulties of the chaebols or a longer-lasting feature 
resulting from deep structural changes in the Korean economy.  
The observed slowdown in Korean OFDI expansion is probably mainly 
due to financial difficulties. As stressed by Lee (2000), it is only natural 
that Korean companies facing a liquidity crisis and strong pressure to 
restructure are reducing the scale of their overseas investment. Despite this 
immediate impact, there is no reason to expect this trend to continue over 
time. Far to the contrary, the long-term trend is towards more OFDI, if 
Korea is to follow the path of all other industrial economies. OFDI was 
found in the past to help growing industries improve or maintain their 
competitiveness and declining industries restructure through the relocation 
of their production overseas. This certainly still holds true, and OFDI will 
no doubt continue to play such a role in the future. Two categories of 
investment can be expected to persist, on the one hand investments that 
may help restructuring due to an erosion of comparative advantages at 
home, and investments aimed at pioneering new markets, maintaining 
acquired markets, or acquiring technology. OFDI should continue to help in 
restructuring the Korean economy through these two channels.  
Yet in the wake of the crisis, fundamental changes in the pattern of 
OFDI can certainly be expected. Even if OFDI is likely to resume its 
interrupted upward trend, it will no doubt take place in different conditions. 
Restructuring efforts at home will necessarily reverberate on Korean firms’ 
overseas activities in the direction of sounder and more rational OFDI. As 
explained earlier, changes in the Korean context will favor market-
orientation and lead to a relative erosion in the role of the chaebols. If such 
is indeed the case, overambitious overseas ventures are likely to come to an 
end, and OFDI will be more in line with economic logic. Streamlining of 
existing investments, as well as expansion of new sounder investments 
should be the rule in the years to come. In this respect, the financial crisis 
may come as a blessing in disguise and help restructure the Korean 
economy and avoid recurrent problems related to excessive diversification, 
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lack of maturity, etc.   
There is thus a strong presumption that Korean OFDI will be gradually 
rationalized in the wake of the crisis, with higher priority given to 
strengthening existing positions and reinforcing the commercial network 
rather than to further expansion of production capacities. It should be a 
priority of the Government to create the appropriate conditions for such 
necessary changes to materialize, yet this strategy is fraught with 
difficulties.  
 
Risks and challenges  A first risk has to do with the fact that financial 
constraints may hinder desirable new investments. A number of firms may 
have difficulties in finding adequate funding for their overseas projects for 
instance. Government assistance may be warranted in such circumstances 
but should be kept to a minimum and awarded under strict conditions and 
after a thorough assessment of the project under consideration.   
As recalled earlier, the priority today is to make sure that OFDI is based 
on different and sounder grounds, in particular that it can contribute to 
enhancing the competitiveness of Korean firms and stimulating economic 
growth without giving rise to excessively risky ventures that may threaten 
the well-being and stability of the national economy as a whole. To this 
end, a number of measures can be imposed regarding the form of financing 
in order to avoid excessive foreign borrowing in particular. Yet, beyond 
these financing issues, a major difficulty pertains to the identification of the 
investments that should be encouraged and those that need to be 
streamlined. The assessment is all the more complicated since some 
investments may appear unprofitable in the short run but may turn out to be 
useful in the longer-term from the point of view of technology acquisition 
for instance. The challenge is to manage to strike a (tricky) balance 
between short-term objectives (currently dominated by financial 
profitability) and longer-term considerations (related to the preservation of 
Korean firms’ competitiveness).  
From the perspective of firms, withdrawal decisions should be limited to 
cases when performance is really poor, while OFDI projects should be 
maintained for competitiveness preservation purposes, even in the absence 
of immediate visible results. In the latter case, public help may be again 
warranted.  
From the point of view of the Government, the problem has really to do 
with the scope of its industrial policy. The promotion of OFDI is rather 
necessary for the improvement of international competitiveness, yet the 
difficulty is to determine which industries should be helped, under which 
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circumstances and where to set the limits for this assistance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A salient feature of the Korean experience is the limited, but effective, role 
of FDI in the country’s economic development and restructuring. Until the 
Asian financial crisis, FDI into Korea remained minimal because of the 
lack of natural resources, the limited size of the local market (the growth of 
which was also held in check by Government policies), as well as because 
of the restrictive policy stance vis-à-vis foreign investors. Restrictions were 
imposed according to the priorities set by the Government rather than 
according to locational advantages. Although FDI has systematically been 
constrained, it played a non negligible role in changing the productive 
structure in Korea. In this respect, inward FDI has contributed very 
selectively to the development of Korea’s technological capabilities and 
contributed to the success of the country’s export-oriented strategy. More 
importantly, by channeling FDI into specific industries, public policies 
contributed to the enhancement of the competitive advantages of Korean 
manufacturers, thereby enabling them to eventually launch their OFDI. It is 
important to note at this stage that the real influence FDI could exert on the 
Korean economy has little to do with its magnitude in absolute terms.  
The liberalization drive initiated in the mid-1980s remained modest, 
first because there was no perceived need to go ahead with such a move 
and second because of the pressure exerted by the chaebols. As a result, 
FDI was not fully used as an instrument of industrial restructuring and as a 
means of enhancing the economy’s overall efficiency, with the financial 
sector as a case in point. The recent crisis gave a renewed momentum to the 
liberalization move, with both friendly and hostile M&As being allowed. 
More than additional capacities in the form of greenfield investments, 
Korea needed more efficient capacities and more competition. The new 
surge of FDI is expected to help Korea develop new competitive 
advantages and be instrumental in enhancing economic efficiency. Again, 
even if FDI remains modest in absolute terms, its possible impact on the 
Korean economy should not be under-estimated. The mere presence of 
foreign agents matters, to the extent that they bring with them not only 
technological know-how but also new business practices and can contribute 
to stimulate competition. The crisis probably ushered in an entirely new era 
characterized by more openness and a larger role for market mechanisms. 
In this respect, FDI is likely to be more fully used as an instrument of 
restructuring and of promotion of transparency. For this change to 
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materialize, however, the momentum must be maintained over a long 
enough period of time. While it is still too early to make a definite 
assessment, the opportunity is there, and Korea should seize it. But it 
remains to be seen whether resistance to change will prevail or give in.   
With respect to OFDI, Korea exhibits again specific characteristics. As 
a result of the emphasis on export orientation, Korean OFDI shifted rapidly 
from being of the resource-seeking kind to being primarily market-seeking 
and export-preserving. Korean OFDI took off in the mid-1980s as a result 
both of a change in public policy following the emergence of a current 
account surplus, and of various structural changes prompting both the 
chaebols and the SMEs to relocate part of their activities in less advanced 
neighboring economies. Korean OFDI in developing countries can be said 
to result primarily from the erosion in competitive advantages due to 
structural changes related to the level of development.  
Since the early-1990s, there has been a new surge in Korean OFDI, 
which responds to more diversified and complex motivations. Korean 
OFDI in OECD countries in particular cannot be fully explained by the 
possession of strong ownership advantages, and may be better accounted 
for by other factors, such as the need to circumvent protectionist barriers or 
to acquire technological assets, as well as the traditional rivalry among the 
chaebols and their tendency to overstretch themselves. These ‘new’ 
investments also reflect a complex interactive relation between OFDI and 
structural change. In Korea, structural change may lead OFDI as much as it 
may be eased or fuelled by it. Yet the expansion of OFDI in the pre-crisis 
period was deemed by many to be to some extent excessive and premature. 
The crisis suggested that a number of policy options may have been flawed 
or, at least, that they may have reached their limits. It also revealed the 
inadequacy of some of the chaebols’ strategies (in particular their strategy 
of worldwide expansion was seriously put into question).  
Since then, there has been a drop and a reorientation in OFDI flows, 
which are now likely to be more in line with Korea’s level of technological 
development. In other words, corporate restructuring efforts go hand in 
hand with streamlining of overseas projects. The challenge is, however, to 
make sure that rationalization only concerns those projects which are not 
economically warranted.     
While Korean OFDI is likely to be trimmed down and restricted to 
sounder projects, IFDI is gaining more importance and helping change the 
way the Korean economy works domestically. An entirely revamped 
Korean economy is likely to emerge as a result of these post crisis policy 
changes. Preliminary evidence suggests that these changes are likely to 
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erode the intimate relationship between the State and family-owned 
business groups, the economy is likely to open further to external 
influences, while the conglomerates’ involvement abroad is likely to be 
scaled down, or at least to proceed at a more reasonable pace. All this will 
lead to a more balanced internationalization of the Korean economy, as 
well as perhaps to a new form of economic governance, if, however, 
resistance to change does not prevail.   
 
________________ 
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